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ABSTRACT 
 
China has become one of the world’s biggest source of outward FDI in the past decade. A fair 
amount of literature have emerged explaining home determinants of China’s outward FDI at 
country- and firm-level. Our study attempts to examine drivers of China’s overseas investment 
from a fresh angle – China’s regional outward FDI. While central outward FDI is made by 
large central firms which are directly supervised and managed by the State Council, regional 
outward FDI is from regional firms that are owned by regional governments and the private 
sector. The rising importance of regional outward FDI compared with central outward FDI 
warrants a thorough investigation on the former. We propose a theoretical framework that 
incorporates an extended Investment Development Path (IDP) theory, home locational 
constraints, policy incentives and geographic factors. Many variables examined in our study 
have never been introduced previously to analyse China’s outward FDI. Empirically, we 
employ the Bayesian Averaging Maximum Likelihood Estimates method to address model 
uncertainty. This is the first time this method is used in FDI literature. All proposed theories 
(except the geographic factors) are found to capture important perspectives explaining China’s 
regional outward FDI. Our results particularly highlight the importance of government policies 
(presence of SOEs, willingness to approve local outward FDI, and investment in R&D), but do 
not support the original IDP hypothesis that outward investment is automatically generated as 
income grows. We found two variables based on the extended IDP theory, namely trade 
openness and agglomeration effect to be robust determinants. Pollution is the only home 
locational constraint that is robust, and geographic factors have little impact on regional 
outward FDI. Our findings have both regional and central policy implications. Central policy 
makers need to recognise that local outward investment may response to different set of factors 
compared with central investment abroad and take this into account when setting outward FDI 
policies. At regional level, our study provides direct reference on tools local government can 
employ to facilitate outward investment.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the implementation of the reform and opening up policy in 1978, China has 
been attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) from the rest of the world and has 
become one of the world’s largest FDI destinations. In the past two decades, however, 
a new trend has emerged – there has been a dramatic increase in China’s outward 
FDI (OFDI), especially after the national policy of encouraging domestic investment 
to “go out” of China in 1999 (see Table 1). In 2011, China was the world’s 6th 
largest source of FDI. Alongside the impressive growth of overseas investment, a fair 
amount of literature has emerged explaining the determinants of China’s OFDI at 
country- (e.g. Liu et al., 2005; Buckley et al., 2007; Cheng & Ma, 2007; Cheung & 
Qian, 2009; Wei & Alon, 2010; Tolentino, 2010; Kolstad & Wigg, 2012), industry- 
(e.g. Amighini et al., 2011) and firm-level (e.g. Amighini et al., 2012; Wang et al., 
 2012). A summary of these studies is presented in Table 2. Compared with previous 
analysis, our study attempts to investigate drivers of China’s overseas investment 
from a fresh angle – China’s regional OFDI. While country-level analysis may ignore 
heterogeneity across Chinese regions, a regional level study would enable us to 
examine whether such heterogeneity had contributed to various level of OFDI across 
the regions. Specifically, out study employs regional level data and focus on home-
country drivers of outward FDI. We propose a comprehensive multi-level theoretical 
framework to investigate home drivers of China’s regional OFDI. It builds on four 
different, but complementary, theoretical explanations, namely the extended 
Investment Development Path (IDP) theory, home locational constraints, policy 
incentives, and geographic factors. We employ the recently developed panel 
Bayesian Averaging of Maximum Likelihood Estimates (BAMLE) by Moral-Benito 
(2012) to deal with model uncertainty, an issue arises when competing theories are 
incorporated within a compressive model.  
THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
After reviewing a range of theoretical FDI models, Faeth (2009) conclude that 
different theories do not necessarily replace each other, but explain different aspects 
of the same phenomenon, and hence that FDI should not be explained by single 
theories but more broadly a combination of them. Buckley et al. (2007) and Wang et 
al. (2012) have done so for China’s OFDI at country- and firm-level, respectively. 
For our regional analysis, we propose a comprehensive theoretical framework that 
combines four complementary theoretical explanations, namely the extended IDP 
theory, home locational constraints, policy incentives, and geographic factors.  
The Extended Investment Development Path Theory 
Dunning’s (1981) Investment Development Path (IDP) theory has provided a 
longstanding explanation of OFDI from many countries. The basic hypothesis of the 
IDP theory is that as a country develops, the localisation advantages in host country 
and the ownership advantages in home country multinational firms will undergo 
change as host countries themselves develop into ownership advantages and thus 
they now generate OFDI and in turn seek localisation advantages elsewhere in 
overseas countries. However, despite having successfully explained OFDI from 
many developed countries, the IDP theory has been put into question when applied to 
developing and transitional economies. For instance, Erdilek (2003) find that some 
developing countries are unable to carry out international activities or fail to develop 
localisation advantages despite moving through economic development stages.  
Thus, as the world’s largest developing economy, does China’s OFDI 
indeed follows the IDP theory or it represents a major exception to it, especially 
given China’s unique economic development path and the role played by its 
governments in the market-oriented economy?  
Home Locational Constraints 
Economic reforms and liberalisation that have widely occurred in developing and 
transitional economies often lead to surges of OFDI as domestic firms, for the first 
time, are allowed to escape rigid home market constraints and to invest abroad. 
Under such circumstance, OFDI from developing and transitional economies is not 
driven by ownership advantages associated with economic development, but by 
 home localisation disadvantages (Svetličič, 2003). Following UNCTAD (2006), 
home locational conditions are ones that influence companies to move abroad and are 
mainly consist of the following types: market and trade conditions, costs of 
production, and local business conditions. For developing and transitional economies, 
these conditions often form home localisation disadvantages for domestic firms.  
Some empirical examples that have confirmed these three common home 
locational constraints as pushing factors that lead developing-country firms to go 
overseas include UNCTAD (2003) for the limited size of domestic markets; Brooks 
& Mirza (2005) for the rising costs of home production; Farrell et al. (2005) for 
intense competition from both local and foreign firms. Therefore, in our study, we 
include home locational constraints as an important theoretical explanation of 
China’s regional OFDI.   
Policy Incentives 
In a recent literature review by Faeth (2009), policy incentives have been found to 
form an important category of theoretical model explaining firms’ overseas 
investment decisions. Specifically, governments can influence the firm’s choice 
between domestic production, licensing or FDI, the firm’s location choice, the firm’s 
choice to stay or to expand, etc. Developing economies often feature the significant 
government involvement in business affairs despite the emergence of market system. 
For instance, Le & Zak (2006) find that policy uncertainty is an important driving 
factor of capital outflow from developing countries. Correspondingly, home 
government policy is regarded as an essential part of an action plan for investment in 
less developed countries proposed by UNCTAD (2011).  
In the case of China, only a few policy variables (e.g., liberalisation policy 
in 1992 in Buckley et al. (2007), interest rate policy and exchange rate policy in Wei 
& Alon (2010) and Tolentino (2010), government support in certain industries in 
Wang et al. (2011)) have been employed by previous analysis as home determinants 
of China’s OFDI. In our study, we not only examine a wide range of central polices, 
but also introduce important local governments’ policies to form a third explanation 
to China’s regional OFDI.  
Geographic Factors 
Gallup et al. (1999) emphasise that geography continues to play an important role for 
economic development, alongside the importance of economic and political 
institutions. Geographic factors of host countries (e.g., landlocked or island economy) 
have been widely employed to explain locational decision of FDI. In the case of 
China, it is widely recognised that there is geographic heterogeneity amongst its 
regions. For instance, some regions are located in the coastal areas while others in the 
inland areas; some regions are richer in natural resources than others; etc. To 
explicitly account for this regional heterogeneity, we introduce geographic factors to 
form the final theoretical explanation of China’s regional OFDI.  
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
An Extended Investment Development Path Theory For Chinese Regions 
In the original IDP theory, the level of economic development is explicitly measured 
by GDP per capita. For Chinese regions, following Liu et al. (2005) and Wei & Alon 
(2010), we also employ an extended IDP theory, i.e., incorporating five economic 
variables (i.e., human capital, trade openness, technology, inward FDI and foreign 
trade surplus1) in addition to Gross Regional Product (GRP) per capita to reflect the 
ownership advantage of regional overseas investors.  
In addition to above five economic variables, agglomeration economies 
arise from the presence of other firms, other industries, as well as from the 
availability of skilled labour force (Venables, 1996). Previous OFDI from a home 
country can create positive externalities, a form of ownership advantage, such as 
factories and production lines that have already been set up, and hence it encourages 
further OFDI flows. As pointed out by Krugman (1997), FDI tends to follow 
previous investment. Cheung & Qian (2009) find overwhelming evidence of 
agglomeration effects for China’s national OFDI. Similarly, the agglomeration 
effects are also applicable for OFDI at regional level. Hypothesis 1: The level of 
China’s regional OFDI is positively related to (a) GRP per capita, (b) human capital, 
(c) inward FDI, (d) international trade, (e) foreign trade surplus, (f) technology 
capability, (g) agglomeration effects.   
Regional Locational Constraints 
As mentioned earlier, we examine three types of locational constraints of the home 
economy, namely market and trade conditions (e.g., limited home market due to 
insufficient domestic consumption), costs of production (e.g., rising cost of labour) 
and local business conditions (e.g., competition from foreign firms). To our 
knowledge, none of these home locational constraints has been empirically examined 
as important home determinants of China’s OFDI at national or regional level.  
In addition to competition from foreign enterprises, inadequate 
infrastructure is also a form of adverse business conditions at home that may push 
domestic investment abroad (UNCTAD, 2006). Similarly, pollution is also a form of 
adverse business condition for Chinese firms, especially given that it has led to 
gradually tightening environmental regulations2. Hypothesis 2: the level of China’s 
regional OFDI is positively related to (a) cost of labour, (b) foreign competition, (c) 
pollution, but negatively related to (d) domestic consumption, (e) infrastructure. 
Policy Incentives of Chinese Regions 
Following Wei & Alon (2010) and Tolentino (2010), we include both interest rate 
and exchange rate as indictors of monetary and foreign exchange policies, 
respectively. In addition to the above two central polices in monetary and foreign 
exchange areas, and to better account for the role of both central and local 
governments, we also include five new central government policies, i.e., credit 
growth, corporate tax, anti-corruption, rights of the workers, presence of State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and two regional government policies, i.e., willingness to 
approve regional OFDI, and investment on research and development (R&D)3. 
Hypothesis 3: The level of China’s regional OFDI is positively related to 
governments’ favourable policies towards (a) appreciation of the exchange rate of the 
RMB, (b) high credit growth, (c) high corporate tax rate, (d) rights of the workers, (e) 
willingness to approve OFDI, (f) investment on R&D, but is negatively related to 
governments’ favourable policies towards (g) high interest rate, (h) anti-corruption 
effort, and (i) presence of SOEs.  
Regional Geographic Characteristics 
The Chinese territory consists of coastal areas and interior land. The coastal areas 
cluster in the east and south of China, forming a belt of more developed regions. 
Porter (1990) argues that advantages gained in clusters can be the foundations of 
successful internationalisation. These advantages go beyond ones due to the co-
presence of related firms and institutions (e.g. transportation links and climate) 
(Swann et al., 1998) to further include labour market pooling, the emergence of 
specialised input suppliers, and technological and knowledge spill overs (Gupta and 
Subramanian, 2008).  
From a home country perspective, there is also huge heterogeneity in the 
amount of natural resources stocks each region possesses across China. In resource 
rich regions, a larger proportion of firms would be serving regional resource industry 
and would be less pressured to expand abroad compared with ones in regions with 
little national resource endowment. Hypothesis 4: The level of China’s regional 
OFDI is positively related to (a) geographic location of being coastal regions, but 
negatively related to (b) natural resource endowment.  
BAYESIAN AVERAGING MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD 
ESTIMATES (BAMLE) PANEL METHOD  
Various models and theories have proposed a fairly large number of variables as 
determinants of outward and inward FDI. Several different models may all seem 
reasonable given the data as they have equal theoretical status but generate different 
conclusion about the parameters of interest. This issue is referred to as model 
uncertainty. The Bayesian Averaging of Maximum Likelihood Estimates (BAMLE) 
method is employed in our study to address such model uncertainty. Our study 
considers not one but four theoretical explanations of China’s regional OFDI and 
hence requires the issue of model uncertainty arises while conventional regression, 
cointegration and Generalised Method of Movements (GMM) (see Table 2) are 
unable to address the issue4.  
In BAMLE framework, a model is formally defined by a likelihood function 
and a prior density. Supposing that there are K possible explanatory variables, there 
will be 2K possible combinations of regressors, or 2K models. All models, denoted by Mj  for j = 1, … , 2K , seek to explain y, the data. θj  is the estimated parameters for 
each model Mj. The logic of Bayesian inference suggests that Baye’s rule is used to 
derive a probability statement about what we do not know (i.e. whether a model is 
correct or not) conditional on what we do know (i.e. the data). This implies that the 
posterior model probability can be used to assess the degree of support for Mj.  
The BAMLE approach of Moral-Benito (2012) extends the Bayesian 
moving average (BMA) methodology mentioned above to a panel data framework 
and employs averaging maximum likelihood estimates in a Bayesian spirit. In other 
words, the posterior probability in the standard BMA method can be rewritten as:   E(θ|y) = ∑ P�Mj�y�E�θ�y, Mj �2Kj=1              (1) 
while the BAMLE approach specifies the posterior probability as: 
E(θ|y) = ∑ P�Mj�y�2Kj=1 θ�MLj    (2) 
where θ�ML
j  is the maximum likelihood estimate for θ in model j. 
In a panel data context, for a give model Mj , the estimated econometric model 
consists of the following equation: yit = αyit−τ + xit′jβj + zi′jγj + ηi + ζt + vit     (t = 1, … T)(i = 1, … N)        (3) 
and two assumptions: vit|yit−1 … yi0, xij, zij, ηi~N(0,σv2)
ηi|yi0, xij, zij~N�φyi0 + δjx�ij,ση2�
where yit−τ denotes lags of the dependent variable. xitj  denotes the kj × 1 vector of
explanatory variables in model Mj. ηi is the time-invariant component of the error 
term capturing the unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. it is the individual specific fixed 
effect. vit  denotes the error tem. ζt  is time dummies in the model which capture 
unobserved common factors across countries and therefore cross-sectional 
dependence is not ruled out. All variables are assumed to be in deviations from their 
cross-sectional mean. zijdenotes a set of regressors which are time-invariant, such as
geographic factors without time variation.  
Under assumptions above, Moral-Benito (2012) derives the likelihood function and 
the posterior model probability for a particular model Mj  using the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) approximation (see Moral-Benito (2012) for details). 
The posterior inclusion probability of a particular variable h is calculated as the sum 
of the posterior model probabilities for all the models including h  (i.e., P(θh ≠ 0|y) = ∑ P�Mj�y�θh≠0 ). 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Data 
Our sample period is 2003-2011. We use annual data for 30 Chinese regions (see 
Appendix B). Tibet is excluded due to data limitations. Variable measurement and 
data sources are discussed in Appendix A. The descriptive statistics and correlation 
matrix are not presented here due to space limitation but are available upon request. 
All correlation coefficients are below 0.8, suggesting that there is generally no 
concern over the correlations amongst determinants.   
BAMLE Results 
Recall Equation (3) above: yit = αyit−τ + xit′jβj + zi′jγj + ηi + ζt + vit    (t = 1, … T)(i = 1, … N)     (3) 
To be more specific, yit is the dependent variable, regional OFDI to Gross Regional 
Product (GRP) ratio. Vector xitj  includes the extended IDP theory variables, home
locational constraints and government incentives, and vector zij  includes the time-
invariant geographic factors. Note that the lagged dependent variable yit−1 , i.e. 
OFDI/GRP(-1), measures one of the extended IDP theory factors, namely the 
agglomeration effect. Also since the BAMLE can accommodate variables without 
time variation zi, we are able to include the two geographic factors (location and 
natural resources endowment) as determinates of China’s regional OFDI.  
Following Moral-Benito (2012), we set the prior mean model size m = 7. 
We also provide results when m = 5 to check whether the results are sensitive to the 
choice of m. The prior inclusion probability (ξ) is determined via: 
ξ = m/K          (4) 
The Bayesian robustness check adopted in the BAMLE approach is the 
posterior inclusion probabilities (PIPs) (h) being higher than the prior inclusion 
probabilities (ξ), i.e., h > ξ. Based on Equation (4), ξ in our study is 0.217 when m =5 and 0.304 when m = 7 (K = 23). The BAMLE test results are presented in Table 3. 
Comparing the two sets of results (m = 5 and m = 7), all variables have the same 
signs, and the same variables are robust irrespective of the choice of m. Specifically, 
robust home determinants of China’s regional OFDI include three government policy 
variables (presence of SOEs, willingness to approve OFDI and investment on R&D), 
two extended IDP theory variables (trade openness and agglomeration effect) and 
one home locational constraint (pollution).  
Looking at our results in Table 3, we first notice that GRP per capita does 
not appear to be a robust determinant of China’s regional OFDI. This is in contrast to 
the prediction of the original IDP hypothesis, Liu et al. (2005) and Wei & Alon 
(2010). Liu et al. (2005) and Wei & Alon (2010), are at aggregate level. Hence their 
conclusions may reflect more of the central OFDI given its dominant share. Also, we 
compete IPD theory with other alternative theories, including the government 
incentives theory. As suggested by Durán & Ubeda (2001), OFDI from developing 
countries may depend less on economic development and more on the activity carried 
out by governments. Our results suggest this is the case for China’s regional OFDI.  
We now investigate our prime interest, the government policy variables. All three 
robust policy variables have the expected signs, confirming our predictions set out in 
Section 3. It is interesting to notice that both regional government policies, namely 
willingness to approve OFDI and investment on R&D, are robust. In contrast, only 
one central government policy, namely presence of SOEs, turns out to be a robust 
determinant. Our results suggest that both central and local governments have strong 
influence on China’s regional OFDI. More importantly, our results especially 
highlight the irreplaceable role of the local governments.  
On the other hand, six other policy variables, all of which are set by the 
central government, turn out to have little influence. One of them is the monetary 
policy, measured by the real base annual lending rate and credit growth set by the 
Chinese central bank. In parallel with formal banking institutions in China, there is a 
flourishing informal financial market. The increasing credit demand of China's 
private enterprises seems to be neglected by the former and hence the latter 
contributes to closing the gap (Tanaka & Molnar, 2008). Thriving informal banking 
sector has greatly weakened the link between monetary policy and the cost and 
availability of regional firms’ financing. In terms of home locational constraints, we 
find that pollution is a robust determinant of China OFDI, but with a negative sign. 
As pointed out by Chow (2008), although the central government recognises the use 
of penalties, specific laws are yet to be clarified in areas such as listing detailed 
polluting activities, estimating their negative externalities, and specifying suitable 
penalties for violation. Firms may be attracted to stay in China if they are paying 
lower penalties than the environmental damage they create.  Domestic consumption, 
labour cost and infrastructure are not robust determinates.  
Turning to the extended IDP theory, we find there are only two economic 
variables, namely trade openness and the agglomeration effect, are robust. It seems 
other four factors have little influence on OFDI at regional level. Both geographic 
factors have high PIPs, but their posterior standard deviations are bigger than the 
posterior means. It implies these two variables are associated with OFDI, although 
we are not able to confirm in which direction. Given the shifting of OFDI sources 
from eastern to inner and western regions, such results may reflect an overall more 
balanced distribution of OFDI among regions across China in recent decade.  
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Our study investigates the home determinants of China’s regional OFDI. We propose 
a theoretical framework that integrates four different yet complementary explanations, 
namely the extended IDP theory, home locational constraints, government incentives 
and geographic factors. Many variables examined in our study have never been 
introduced previously to analyse China’s OFDI. At empirical level, we employ the 
BAMLE method to deal with the issue of model uncertainty. This is the first time this 
method is used in FDI literature.  
Overall, our results first confirm all proposed theories (except the 
geographic factors) capture important perspectives explaining China’s regional 
outward FDI. Second, our findings highlight the importance of government policies 
variables, namely presence of SOEs, willingness to approve local OFDI and 
investment in R&D. More importantly, we find local government policies (such as 
the latter two policies above) have sizeable influence over regional OFDI. Third, our 
study does not support the original IDP hypothesis that outward investment is 
automatically generated as income grows. Fourth, robust variables that based on the 
extended IDP theory include trade openness and agglomeration effect, and pollution 
is the only home locational constraint that is robust. Fifth, geographic factors have 
little impact of regional OFDI.  
Our study provides important policy implications. Central policy makers 
need to recognise that local investment may respond to different set of factors 
compared with central investment abroad and take these differences into account 
when setting OFDI policies. For instance, whilst granting lower interest rates on 
loans to facilitate OFDI may boost overseas investment from centrally-owned 
enterprises, it may have little impact on investment decisions of local firms as their 
financing mainly depends on informal financial markets. Hence measures that can 
lower interest rates in the informal financial markets is needed instead to encourage 
regional OFDI. At regional level, our study provides direct reference on tools local 
government can employ to support firms’ overseas investment, such as more 
investment on R&D, approving OFDI projects based on their merits rather than local 
economic growth and unemployment rates, directing certain amount of resources 
away from SOEs. In addition, local authorities can also help encourage foreign trade, 
price pollution properly, and carry out firmly penalties on pollution.  
ENDNOTES 
* This paper is written under the Research Fellowship Programme, BOFIT Institute for
Economies in Transition, Bank of Finland. 
1 FX reserves usually refers to the amount of foreign currency the country owns. Given that 
our analysis is at regional level, we name this variable regional foreign trade surplus. See You 
and Sarantis (2012) for a review of China’s recent FX policies.  
2 In 1989, the first Environment Protection Law was put forward in China. At firm level, in 
2006, Corporate Social Responsibility has become a law introduced under the Company Law 
in China. 
3 Due to space limitation, for more discussion on policy incentive variables that are introduced 
in Hypothesis 3, please refer to the working paper version of this paper at 
https://helda.helsinki.fi/bof/bitstream/handle/123456789/13672/dp1615%5B1%5D.pdf?sequen
ce=1. 
4 Please refer to Moral-Benito (2012) for a discussion on advantages of BAMLE compared 
with alternative methods such as BACE (Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates), BMA 
(Bayesian Model Averaging) and EBA (Extreme Bounds Analysis). 
APPENDIX A. REGIONAL VARIABLE MEASUREMENT AND DATA 
SOURCE (2003-2011) 
Outward FDI is measured as the outward FDI divided by gross regional product (GRP). Data is 
collected from SBCOFDI and CSY. Variable measurement and data source for other variables 
are listed below. Note that SBCOFDI: Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment; CSY: China Statistical Yearbook; IFS: International Financial Statistics; CCSY: 
China City Statistical Yearbook; ACFB: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking; PYC: 
Procuratorial Yearbook of China; CLSY: China Labour Statistical Yearbook, PBC: People’s 
Bank of China. All price indices have 2005 as the base year (2005=100). All data are at 
regional level (note that the annual base interest rate set by the central bank and the nominal 
exchange of CNY/USD are national level data before they were adjusted by regional CPI to 
obtain the regional real terms). All variables are in natural logarithm except the cost of labour 
and interest rate. 
(1) GRP per capita: Real GRP per capita (nominal GRP adjusted by consumer price index 
(CPI)) divided by regional population); CSY  
(2) human capital: average schooling years of working population (see Wang and Yao (2003) 
for a similar measurement); CSY 
(3) inward FDI: inward FDI divided by GRP; CCSY, CSY 
(4) international trade: sum of export and import divided by GRP; CCSY, CSY 
(5) foreign trade surplus: export minus import divided by GRP; CCSY, CSY 
(6) technology capability: patent applications divided by population; CSY 
(7) agglomeration effects: outward FDI of the previous year; SBCOFDI, CSY 
(8) cost of labour: growth rate of real average salary (nominal salary adjusted by CPI) per 
person; CSY 
(9) foreign competition: exports from foreign invested enterprises divided by total exports; 
CSY 
(10) pollution: the amount of CO2 emission (standard cubic meter) divided by population; CSY 
(11) domestic consumption: household consumption divided by GRP; CSY 
(12) infrastructure: number of landlines per person; CSY 
(13) RMB exchange rate: real CNY/USD exchange rate (nominal rate adjusted by relative CPI 
of the US to each Chinese region); IFS, CSY 
(14) credit growth: loan growth divided by GRP; ACFB, CSY 
(15) corporate tax rate: corporate tax divided by GRP; CCSY, CSY 
(16) rights of the workers: number of trade unions divided by population; CLSY, CSY 
(17) willingness to approve OFDI: unemployment rate; CSY 
(18) investment on R&D: ratio of regional governments’ investment on science and research to 
total governments’ expenditure; CSY 
(19) interest rate: annual national base interest rate set by the central bank adjusted by regional 
CPI to obtain the real regional rates; PBC, CSY 
(20) anti-corruption effort : number of registered cases under the direct investigation of the 
people’s procuratorates divided by population; PYC, CSY 
(21) presence of SOEs: SOEs’ output to GRP (SOEs defined following Duanmu (2012) and 
Amighini et al.;  CSY 
(22) Geographic location: one for coastal (non-landlocked) regions (Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan) and zero 
for interior regions 
(23) Natural resources endowment: one for natural resources rich regions (regions with stock 
in coal higher than regional average) (Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Anhui, Shandong, Henan, 
Shaanxi and Xinjiang) and zero for other regions; CSY 
APPENDIX  B. REGIONS IN CHINA 
There are thirty one regions in China, which include twenty two provinces (Anhui, Fujian, 
Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, 
Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Zhejiang), 
five Autonomous Regions (Guangxi , Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, Xinjiang) and four 
Municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin). In our study we include all these 
regions except Tibet due to data limitations. 
TABLE 1. CHINA’S OFDI AT CENTRAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS 
(MILLION USD) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total 
OFDI 2855 5498 12261 17634 26506 41859 47795 60182 68584 
Central 
OFDI 2098 4525 10204 15237 21253 35983 38193 42437 45023 
Regional 
OFDI 757 973 2058 2397 5253 5876 9603 17745 23560 
Regional 
/Total 
OFDI (%) 
26.5 17.7 16.8 13.6 19.8 14.0 20.1 29.5 34.4 
TABLE 2. REVIEW OF RECENT EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ON DETERMINANTS OF CHINA’S OFDI 
Authors Level Home/
Host 
Theoretical Framework Methodology 
Liu et al. (2005) Country Home Investment Development Path (IDP) theory Cointegration and GMM 
Wei & Alon (2010) Country Home Extended IDP theory Partial least square regression) 
Tolentino (2010) Country Home Home country-specific macroeconomic factors of China and 
India (it is argued that ownership advantages reflect national 
economic characteristics) 
Vector Autoregression (VAR) 
model  
Buckley et al. (2007) Country Host Three special explanations (capital market imperfections, special 
ownership advantages and institutional factors) are nested within 
the general theory of the multinational firm (Market-seeking 
motive, resources seeking motive, strategic asset seeking motive) 
Regression analysis (pooled OLS 
and random effect Generalised 
Least Squares(GLS)) 
Cheng & Ma (2008) Country Host A set of macroeconomic variables are identified based on 
literature review and data availability 
Regression analysis (on a gravity 
model) 
Cheung & Qian 
(2009) 
Country Host Market-seeking motive,  resources seeking motive Regression analysis 
Kolstad & Wigg 
(2012) 
Country Host Determinants are identified based on conclusions derived from 
review of literature and the characteristics of the Chinese 
economy 
Regression analysis 
Amighini et al. (2011) Industry Host Market-seeking motive, resources seeking motive, strategic asset 
seeking  
Random effect probit model 
Wang et al. (2012) Firm Home A combination of three theoretical frameworks: resource based 
view of firms, industrial organisation economy, and institutional 
theory (to capture firm, industry, and country level variables 
respectively) 
Regression analysis 
Amighini et al. (2012) Ownership 
(SOEs and 
private firms) 
Host Market-seeking motive, resources seeking motive, strategic asset 
seeking motive 
Random effect panel Poisson 
model 
TABLE 3. BAMLE APPROACH RESULTS 
Variables m=5 m=7 
(PIPs) 
(h) PM PSD (PIPs) (h) PM PSD 
Extended IDP theory 
(1) GRP per capita 0.022 -0.001 0.002 0.037 -0.001 0.002 
(2) human capital 0.044 -0.061 0.061 0.063 -0.060 0.062 
(3) inward FDI 0.025 0.000 0.002 0.036 
 
0.000 0.003 
(4) international trade 0.735 0.017 0.006 0.855 0.018 0.006 
(5) foreign trade surplus 0.095 -0.006 0.006 0.130 -0.006 0.006 
(6) technology capability 0.053 0.002 0.005 0.071 0.003 0.005 
(7) agglomeration effects 1.000 0.477 0.115 1.000 0.470 0.115 
Home locational 
constraints 
(8) cost of labour 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.000 
(9) foreign competition 0.031 0.001 0.006 0.053 0.000 0.007 
(10) pollution 0.352 -0.019 0.012 0.454 -0.020 0.012 
(11) domestic consumption 0.050 0.007 0.014 0.069 0.007 0.014 
(12) infrastructure 0.051 -0.008 0.007 0.074 -0.008 0.007 
Government incentives 
(13) RMB exchange rate 0.055 0.109 0.082 0.098 0.123 0.083 
(14) credit growth 0.025 0.002 0.006 0.042 0.001 0.006 
(15) corporate tax rate 0.186 0.014 0.007 0.199 0.013 0.007 
(16) rights of the workers 0.118 -0.021 0.012 0.197 -0.023 0.013 
(17) willingness to approve 
OFDI 
1.000 -0.100 0.016 1.000 -0.098 0.016 
(18) investment on R&D 0.309 0.030 0.016 0.401 0.030 0.016 
(19) interest rate 0.052 -0.002 0.001 0.080 -0.002 0.001 
(20) anti-corruption effort  0.044 -0.004 0.004 0.065 -0.004 0.004 
(21) presence of SOEs 0.781 -0.044 0.013 0.866 -0.044 0.013 
Geographic factors 
(22) Geographic location 0.478 0.002 0.004 0.432 0.001 0.004 
(23) Natural resources 
endowment 
0.535 -0.003 0.003 0.587 -0.003 0.003 
 Note: PIPs: Posterior Inclusion Probability; PM: Posterior Mean; PSD: Posterior Standard 
Deviation. GAUSS algorithm for the BAMLE method is provided by Dr. Moral-Benito. The 
number of iterations of the algorithm is set at one million.  Following Moral-Benito (2012), the 
Bayesian robustness check adopted in the BAMLE approach is the PIPs (ℎ) being higher than 
the prior inclusion probabilities (𝜉𝜉), i.e., ℎ > 𝜉𝜉. Based on Equation (4), 𝜉𝜉 in our study is 0.217 
when 𝑚𝑚 = 5 and 0.304 when 𝑚𝑚 = 7 (𝐾𝐾 = 23). 
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